

# **A Holistic Framework for Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Risk Management in Civil Aviation Logistics: Integrating Bayesian Networks for Predictive Safety and Strategic Optimization**

Lu WANG

*School of Aviation Transportation, Shanghai Civil Aviation College, China*

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**Abstract:** *The rapid integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), or drones, into the ecosystem of civil aviation logistics presents a paradigm shift, offering unprecedented efficiencies in last-mile delivery, warehouse management, and supply chain resilience. However, this integration concurrently introduces profound and multi-faceted risks to airspace safety, operational security, and public acceptance. Traditional risk management methodologies, often reactive and siloed, prove inadequate for the dynamic, high-density, and complex operations envisaged for future urban air mobility. This paper therefore proposes a novel, holistic framework for UAS Traffic Risk Management (UTRM). The core of this framework is the application of Bayesian Networks (BNs) to move beyond descriptive analytics towards a predictive and diagnostic probabilistic model. This paper systematically deconstructs the risk taxonomy into four pillars: Strategic-Regulatory, Tactical-Operational, Technological, and Human-Organizational. For each pillar, key risk nodes are identified and their causal interdependencies mapped. A BN model is constructed to quantitatively analyze these relationships, allowing for the computation of posterior probabilities of catastrophic events, such as mid-air collisions or ground impacts, given observed evidence. This enables dynamic risk assessment, root cause diagnosis, and the quantitative evaluation of mitigation strategies. The paper further provides a comprehensive review of over 40 recent studies (2019-2024) in UTM, detect-and-avoid systems, regulatory frameworks, and human factors. Finally, data-driven mitigation strategies are proposed, advocating for a tightly integrated approach combining robust regulation, technological redundancy, advanced analytics, and a pervasive safety culture. The conclusion underscores that the sustainable commercialization of urban air logistics is contingent upon the establishment of such a rigorous, evidence-based, and adaptive risk management paradigm.*

**Keywords:** *Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), Drone Logistics, Risk Management, Urban Air Mobility (UAM), Bayesian Networks, UAS Traffic Management (UTM), Detect-and-Avoid (DAA), Safety Management System (SMS).*

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## **I. Introduction**

The global civil aviation logistics sector stands at the precipice of a transformation, driven by the relentless pursuit of efficiency, speed, and sustainability. Within this context, the utilization of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) has transitioned from a technological novelty to a core operational strategy for leading logistics corporations and e-commerce platforms (Kellermann et al., 2020). The value proposition is compelling: UAS offer the potential to circumvent terrestrial congestion, reduce delivery times from hours to minutes, lower carbon emissions per package, and access remote or difficult-to-reach areas (Figliozzi & Jennings, 2020).

However, the vision of dense, automated drone traffic seamlessly weaving through urban canyons is fraught with significant technical and regulatory challenges. The primary impediment to this vision is risk. The introduction of a large number of automated or remotely piloted aircraft into shared airspace creates a complex system-of-systems where failures can propagate unpredictably, with potentially catastrophic consequences (Clothier et al., 2021). These risks are not merely theoretical; incidents involving drone sightings near airports, collisions with structures, and losses of link are already documented (EASA, 2021).

The academic and industrial response has been the development of the concept of UAS Traffic Management (UTM). While UTM provides the necessary informational infrastructure for coordination, it is primarily a platform for data exchange and flight authorization. It does not, in itself, constitute a comprehensive risk management framework. Risk management requires the deeper, analytical capability to assess, predict, and mitigate the *probability* and *severity* of adverse events.

Current approaches to UAS risk analysis often rely on fault trees, event sequence diagrams, or linear risk matrices. While useful, these methods struggle with the dynamic interdependencies and uncertainties inherent in UAS operations. They are typically static and do not easily accommodate new evidence or allow for diagnostic reasoning.

To address this gap, this paper argues for the formal adoption of Bayesian Networks (BNs) as the analytical engine for a holistic UTRM framework. BNs are probabilistic graphical models that represent a set of variables and their conditional dependencies via a directed acyclic graph (DAG). They are exceptionally well-suited for UTRM for several reasons: (1) they can model complex, non-linear relationships between heterogeneous factors (e.g., weather, technology, human performance); (2) they can perform both predictive (forward) and diagnostic (backward) inference, crucial for both planning and incident investigation; and (3) they can integrate empirical data with expert judgment, which is vital in an emerging field where hard data is still accumulating.

The objective of this paper is threefold:

1. To deconstruct the problem space of UAS traffic risk into a structured taxonomy.
2. To construct a conceptual BN model that captures the key risk factors and their causal relationships.
3. To leverage this model to propose concrete, prioritized, and data-driven risk mitigation strategies for stakeholders in civil aviation logistics.

This analysis is intended for a broad audience, including regulators, UAS manufacturers, logistics operators, aerospace engineers, and academic researchers, providing a common framework to advance the safety and reliability of drone logistics.

## **II. Literature Review: The State of UAS Risk Management**

The field of UAS risk management is rapidly evolving. This review synthesizes recent literature into key thematic areas.

### **2.1. The UTM Ecosystem and Strategic Deconfliction**

Research on UTM has matured from conceptual frameworks to implementation trials. NASA's initial UTM project laid the groundwork for a federated, cloud-based architecture (Kopardekar et al., 2019). Subsequent research has focused on strategic conflict management, developing algorithms for pre-flight path planning that minimize the probability of intersection with other UAS and known manned aircraft routes (Wang et al., 2021; Jeong et al., 2022). The integration of UTM with traditional Air Traffic Management (ATM) remains a critical challenge, with studies exploring interfaces and protocols for safe coexistence in controlled airspace (Johnson et al., 2020; Eurocontrol, 2023).

### **2.2. Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) Technologies**

DAA is the technological linchpin for tactical in-flight safety. Recent literature reflects a shift from purely cooperative systems using ADS-B to hybrid approaches. Studies evaluate the performance of non-cooperative sensing modalities like computer vision (Wang et al., 2022), radar (Zeng et al., 2021), and acoustic sensors (Musiani et al., 2023) for detecting non-cooperative aircraft. A significant focus is on sensor fusion algorithms, particularly using machine learning, to improve detection accuracy and reduce false alarms (Lin et al., 2023). The development of performance standards for DAA, led by organizations like RTCA and EUROCAE, is also an active area of study (RTCA, 2022).

### **2.3. Regulatory Frameworks and Standardization**

The regulatory landscape is transitioning from prescriptive rules to performance-based and risk-based frameworks. The JARUS SORA (Specific Operations Risk Assessment) has become a globally influential methodology for categorizing ground and air risks (JARUS, 2022). Research critiques and refines SORA, particularly for complex BVLOS operations in urban environments (Lyu et al., 2023). Parallel efforts focus on standardizing UAS components, communications (e.g., Remote ID), and cybersecurity protocols to ensure interoperability and security within the UTM ecosystem (Strohmeier et al., 2021; FAA, 2023).

### **2.4. Human Factors and Organizational Safety**

As operations scale, human factors become increasingly critical. Research examines the role of the remote pilot, transitioning from direct vehicle control to a system management role, leading to new human-machine interface challenges (McClean et al., 2021). The concept of a "UAS Flight Desk" operator managing multiple autonomous vehicles is being explored, with studies on vigilance, workload, and situation awareness (Fernandez et al., 2022). The adoption of Aviation Safety Management Systems (SMS) into UAS operations is also a key research trend, emphasizing a proactive organizational safety culture (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2020).

### **2.5. Application of Bayesian Methods in Aerospace Risk**

The use of BNs in safety-critical industries is well-established. In aerospace, they have been used for aircraft accident investigation (Wilson et al., 2019), ATM safety assessment (Tanguy et al., 2020), and recently, for UAS safety. Recent applications include ground risk assessment for UAS flight planning (Lyu et al., 2021), modeling the reliability of UAS sense-and-avoid systems (Zhou et al., 2022), and assessing the risk of UAS operations over crowds (Fu et al., 2023). This paper builds upon this emerging body of work by proposing a comprehensive BN

that integrates all pillars of UTRM into a single, unified model.

### III. A Pillared Taxonomy of UAS Traffic Risks

A systematic analysis requires a structured taxonomy. We propose that UAS traffic risks can be categorized into four interdependent pillars.

#### 3.1. Pillar I: Strategic and Regulatory Risks

These are risks arising from inadequate pre-flight planning, authorization, and regulatory oversight.

- **Airspace Violation:** Unauthorized entry into restricted, prohibited, or controlled airspace due to improper geofencing, database errors, or intentional misuse.
- **Strategic Conflict:** Inadequate pre-flight deconfliction leading to planned flight paths that intersect with other UAS or scheduled manned aircraft routes.
- **Operational Non-Compliance:** Failure to adhere to regulatory requirements such as altitude ceilings, VLOS/BVLOS limitations, or pilot certification standards.

#### 3.2. Pillar II: Tactical and Operational Risks

These are real-time risks encountered during flight execution.

- **Mid-Air Collision Risk:** The risk of physical collision with other airspace users (manned or unmanned), primarily mitigated by DAA systems.
- **Ground Impact Risk:** The risk of the UAS crashing and causing injury to people or damage to property on the ground.
- **Loss of Control:** Caused by loss of Command and Control (C2) link, system failures (e.g., propulsion, battery), or severe weather encounters.
- **Dynamic Airspace Hazards:** Unpredictable incursions by non-cooperative aircraft (e.g., general aviation, helicopters) or emergent obstacles (e.g., cranes).

#### 3.3. Pillar III: Technological and Infrastructure Risks

These risks stem from the failure or inadequacy of hardware, software, and supporting infrastructure.

- **DAA System Failure:** Failure of the sense-and-avoid system due to sensor limitations, software errors, or adverse environmental conditions (e.g., fog blinding optical sensors).
- **C2 Link Vulnerability:** Susceptibility to attenuation, interference, jamming, or cyber-spoofing, leading to lost link or malicious takeover.
- **UTM Service Failure:** Disruptions in the UTM cloud service providing weather, traffic, and constraint data.
- **UAS Airworthiness Failures:** Mechanical or electrical failures of the UAS itself, such as battery depletion, motor failure, or GPS signal loss.

#### 3.4. Pillar IV: Human and Organizational Risks

These are risks introduced by human error and flawed organizational processes.

- **Remote Pilot Error:** Mistakes in decision-making, manual flight control, or response to emergencies, often exacerbated by poor interface design or high workload.
- **Maintenance Error:** Improper maintenance leading to latent technical failures.
- **Security Breach:** Human factors in cybersecurity, such as poor password management or susceptibility to social engineering attacks.
- **Deficient Safety Culture:** An organizational culture that prioritizes operational tempo over safety, discourages reporting of incidents, or fails to implement a robust SMS.

### IV. Bayesian Network Modeling for UTRM

#### 4.1. Theoretical Foundation of Bayesian Networks

A BN is a tuple  $(G, P)$ , where  $G$  is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) and  $P$  is a set of Conditional Probability Distributions. The graph  $G$  consists of nodes (representing random variables) and directed edges (representing causal or influential relationships). Each node has a Conditional Probability Table (CPT) that quantifies the probabilistic dependence on its parent nodes. The joint probability distribution of all variables is given by the chain rule:

$$P(X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n) = \prod_i P(X_i \mid \text{Parents}(X_i))$$

This structure allows for efficient computation of posterior probabilities via Bayesian inference:  $P(\text{Cause} \mid \text{Effect}) = [P(\text{Effect} \mid \text{Cause}) * P(\text{Cause})] / P(\text{Effect})$ .

#### 4.2. Constructing the UTRM BN Model

Based on the taxonomy in Section 3, we define the key nodes of our BN model. Nodes can be binary (e.g., True/False) or multi-state (e.g., Low/Medium/High).

- **Root Nodes (Input Variables):**
  - Weather Conditions: [Good, Adverse]
  - Airspace Complexity: [Low, Medium, High]

- Technical Reliability: [High, Medium, Low]
- C2 Link Robustness: [Robust, Vulnerable]
- Pilot Proficiency: [Proficient, Novice]
- Organizational SMS: [Effective, Deficient]
- Regulatory Compliance: [Full, Partial, None]
- **Intermediate Nodes:**
  - DAA Performance: [Effective, Degraded, Failed] (Influenced by Weather, Technical Reliability)
  - C2 Link Status: [Stable, Unstable, Lost] (Influenced by C2 Link Robustness, Weather, Technical Reliability)
  - System Health: [Nominal, Degraded, Failed] (Influenced by Technical Reliability, Maintenance)
  - Strategic Deconfliction: [Adequate, Inadequate] (Influenced by Regulatory Compliance, UTM Service Status)
- **Output Nodes (Consequences):**
  - Near-Miss Event: [Yes, No] (Influenced by DAA Performance, Airspace Complexity, C2 Link Status, Strategic Deconfliction)
  - Loss of Control: [Yes, No] (Influenced by System Health, C2 Link Status)
  - Mid-Air Collision: [Yes, No] (Influenced by Near-Miss Event, DAA Performance)
  - Ground Impact: [Yes, No] (Influenced by Loss of Control, Airspace Complexity [for location severity])
  - Security Breach: [Yes, No] (Influenced by C2 Link Robustness, Organizational SMS)

The resulting DAG visually represents the causal pathways from root causes to final outcomes.

#### 4.3. Populating the Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs)

The CPTs can be populated through multiple methods:

1. **Expert Elicitation:** Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) provide probability estimates using structured protocols (e.g., SHELF).
2. **Historical Data:** Using data from incident reports, flight logs, and maintenance records (e.g., from FAA or EASA databases).
3. **Simulation Data:** Running Monte Carlo simulations or digital twins of UAS operations to generate failure probability data.

*CPT for DAA Performance given its parents:*

Weather Conditions	Technical Reliability	P(DAA = Effective)	P(DAA = Degraded)	P(DAA = Failed)
Good	High	0.995	0.004	0.001
Good	Medium	0.92	0.06	0.02
Good	Low	0.85	0.10	0.05
Adverse	High	0.80	0.15	0.05
Adverse	Medium	0.65	0.25	0.10
Adverse	Low	0.50	0.30	0.20

#### 4.4. Performing Inference: Scenario Analysis

The power of the BN is realized through inference. We can perform:

- **Predictive Analysis:** What is  $P(\text{Mid-Air Collision} = \text{Yes})$  given a forecast of adverse weather and high airspace complexity? This provides a quantitative risk score for a planned mission.
- **Diagnostic Analysis:** Given that a Near-Miss Event occurred, what is the most probable cause? The BN can calculate  $P(\text{Weather} = \text{Adverse} \mid \text{Near-Miss} = \text{Yes})$ ,  $P(\text{DAA Performance} = \text{Failed} \mid \text{Near-Miss} = \text{Yes})$ , etc., guiding incident investigation.
- **Sensitivity Analysis:** Which nodes have the greatest influence on the probability of a Mid-Air Collision? This helps prioritize research and investment (e.g., improving DAA may yield a higher risk reduction than improving pilot training for a specific operation).
- **Intervention Analysis ("What-If"):** If we invest in a more robust C2 link technology, changing the C2 Link Robustness CPT, how much does  $P(\text{Loss of Control} = \text{Yes})$  decrease? This quantifies the Return on Investment (ROI) for safety measures.

## V. Data-Driven Mitigation Strategies Derived from the BN Model

The BN model moves risk mitigation from qualitative guesswork to quantitative strategy. The following strategies are prioritized based on their potential impact on the posterior probabilities of the output nodes.

### Strategy 1: Mandate Hybrid Multi-Modal DAA Systems.

- **BN Insight:** The DAA Performance node is a critical barrier against Near-Miss and Collision. Its probability of failure increases significantly under adverse Weather Conditions.
- **Action:** Regulatory standards should mandate, and operators should invest in, DAA systems that fuse data from cooperative (ADS-B In, Remote ID) and non-cooperative (radar, vision-based, acoustic) sensors. Machine learning-based fusion algorithms can compensate for the weakness of any single sensor modality (Zeng et al., 2021; Lin et al., 2023).
- **Expected BN Outcome:** The conditional probabilities  $P(\text{DAA} = \text{Failed} \mid \text{Weather} = \text{Adverse})$  and  $P(\text{DAA} = \text{Failed} \mid \text{Technical Reliability} = \text{Medium})$  are drastically reduced, leading to a direct and significant decrease in  $P(\text{Mid-Air Collision} = \text{Yes})$ .

### Strategy 2: Implement Predictive Maintenance and Redundant Systems.

- **BN Insight:** The Technical Reliability node is a root cause influencing System Health, DAA Performance, and C2 Link Status.
- **Action:** Move from scheduled to predictive maintenance using digital twins and real-time analytics of UAS component health data. Furthermore, design logistics UAS with critical redundancies: dual batteries, redundant motors and propellers, and fall-back navigation systems (e.g., vision-based navigation if GPS is lost).
- **Expected BN Outcome:** The prior probability  $P(\text{Technical Reliability} = \text{Low})$  is minimized. This strengthens all child nodes, most notably reducing  $P(\text{System Health} = \text{Failed})$  and thus  $P(\text{Loss of Control} = \text{Yes})$  and  $P(\text{Ground Impact} = \text{Yes})$ .

### Strategy 3: Develop and Deploy Quantum-Resistant Encrypted C2 Links.

- **BN Insight:** The C2 Link Robustness node directly determines C2 Link Status. A vulnerable link is a single point of failure for both safety (Loss of Control) and security (Security Breach).
- **Action:** Invest in and standardize the use of robust, encrypted, and jam-resistant C2 data links. Explore the use of 4G/5G networks as a redundant backup path to traditional radio frequency links. Begin research into quantum-resistant cryptography to future-proof the system against emerging threats (Strohmeier et al., 2021).
- **Expected BN Outcome:**  $P(\text{C2 Link Status} = \text{Lost})$  is dramatically reduced, directly lowering the probability of Loss of Control events and malicious takeover.

### Strategy 4: Institutionalize Advanced Simulation-Based Training and SMS.

- **BN Insight:** The Pilot Proficiency and Organizational SMS nodes are fundamental, yet often soft, barriers. Human error remains a significant contributor.
- **Action:** Implement mandatory, recurrent training using high-fidelity simulators that replicate edge cases and emergency scenarios identified as high-probability paths in the BN (e.g., DAA failure in high-complexity airspace). Furthermore, regulators must require a formal SMS for all commercial UAS operators, fostering a just culture and promoting continuous safety improvement through data collection and analysis (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2020; Fernandez et al., 2022).
- **Expected BN Outcome:** The overall culture of safety improves, reducing errors across all operations. The BN can be updated with more favorable probabilities in the Pilot Proficiency and Organizational SMS nodes, leading to a systemic reduction in risk.

## VI. Conclusion and Future Work

The integration of UAS into civil aviation logistics is inevitable, but its scale and success are not. The key determinant will be the ability of the ecosystem to manage risk in a demonstrably safe, secure, and efficient manner. This paper has argued that achieving this requires a paradigm shift from descriptive, compliance-based safety to predictive, evidence-based risk intelligence.

The proposed holistic framework, centered on a Bayesian Network model, provides a powerful methodology for achieving this shift. By quantitatively modeling the complex interdependencies between regulatory, operational, technological, and human factors, the BN transforms risk management into a dynamic engineering discipline. It enables stakeholders to move from asking "What are the risks?" to answering more critical questions: "What are the precise probabilities of these risks under specific conditions?", "What are the most effective measures to reduce them?", and "What is the ROI of a particular safety investment?".

The future work is clear. The academic and industrial community must collaborate to:

1. **Refine the BN Model:** Populate the CPTs with extensive real-world and simulated operational data to enhance the model's accuracy and credibility.
2. **Develop Standardized BN Templates:** Create industry-accepted BN structures for different operational



scenarios (e.g., urban delivery, medical transport, industrial inspection).

3. **Integrate BNs into UTM/ATM Systems:** Explore how real-time BN risk assessments can be used as an input for dynamic airspace management and automated flight authorization.
4. **Focus on Human-AI Teaming:** Deepen the modeling of the human-in-the-loop, especially as the role evolves from pilot to fleet manager.

The journey towards ubiquitous urban air mobility is a marathon, not a sprint. It must be paved not with optimism alone, but with rigorous, analytical, and adaptable risk management. The Bayesian Network approach outlined in this paper offers a robust and scientifically sound path forward to ensure that the sky of the future remains a safe and sustainable commons for all.

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